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Introduction 
Agricultural credit has been a cornerstone of most agricultural develop-
ment programs in less-developed countries (LDCs). Domestic governments and 
donors of foreign aid alike have allocated significant sums for agricultural 
credit programs (Adams). 
This paper argues that, although such programs are said to be econom-
ically oriented, they are very susceptible to being used by LDC governments 
as political tools. Thus, a political economy of agricultural credit emerges 
in which credit is allocated to satisfy political objectives. 
There are five major reasons why the political economy of agricultural 
credit has become important. First, governments typically control the formal 
market supply of agricultural credit. 1 Much credit flows to agriculture through 
government agricultural development banks. Further, much of the formal credit 
coming from the private sector only comes about as a result of government policies 
which force lending to agriculture. Therefore, governments have the ability to 
strongly influence the distribution and allocation of credit. (If a high pro-
portion of total credit is from the informal market, this influence will be 
reduced.) Second, concessionary interest rate policy, which is almost ubiquitous 
in LDC agricultural credit programs, provides for an attractive income transfer 
to borrowers. Third, when governments permit long-term delinquency, a common 
condition in LDCs, the borrower receives a temporary income transfer for the 
period of the delinquency. If he never repays, it becomes a permanent transfer. 
Fourth, when inflation is present, the magnitude of the concessionary and 
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delinquency transfers is magnified. Fifth, the advantages of obtaining these 
transfers are sufficiently attractive that they can be used by governments to 
curry the favor of borrowers and, conversely, by borrowers to pledge support to 
government. 
Credit programs are particularly alluring for political purposes. First, 
they are easy to establish and administer. Second, they are very legitimate 
for economic objectives. Third, because monies are fungible and because of the 
hidden transfers, the true uses of such funds are difficult to identify. Thus, 
credit lends itself to being used for political purposes under the guise of 
economic development. 
The extent to which economic decisions are influenced by political factors, 
or vice versa, is difficult to ascertain in practice. It is becoming increasingly 
clear, however, that not only is there the potential for political forces to 
impact heavily on agricultural credit programs, but also they probably play a 
more important role than has been previously recognized. 2 
This paper first describes the evolution of the institutional and policy 
structure of credit programs in LDCs. The role of foreign aid is emphas~zed. 
Second, a model of the political economy of agricultural credit is specified. 
Third, the model is applied to Bolivia, an archetype of underdevelopment where 
political factors often predominate and where there have been massive infusions 
of foreign aid for agricultural credit. Fourth, conclusions and policy impli-
cations are set forth. 
The Evolution of Institutional and Policy Structures 
Commercial financial institutions in LDCs have shunned lending to agri-
culture because of the high costs and risks embodied in these loans (Donald, 
pp. 27-35). Thus, pressures were placed on governments to provide alternative 
sources of financing. The solution has been to establish government agricul-
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tural banks. Many LDC countries had established these banks prior to the 
emphasis on development in the 1950s. Typically, however, they were utilized 
to finance the already established and oftentimes wealthy farmers rather than 
small farmers. In the development decades of the 1950s and 1960s, many other 
countries established government agricultural banks in response to economic 
and political pressures for development. From an economic view, the passivity 
of the agricultural sector dictated a supply-leading financial approach. 3 From 
a political view, agricultural development, or at least the opportunity for 
development in various product lines or regions, was stabilizing. 
When it became obvious that government institutions could not meet the 
needs of financing agriculture, means were sought to force the private sector 
to lend to agriculture. Central bank rediscount mechanisms, .loan guarantees 
and loan portfolio requirements were common policies. 
Almost without exception all of these agricultural credit programs in-
corporated a feature transferred from the United States Farmers Home Admini-
stration credit model--the concessionary interest rate; because, from an 
economic standpoint, it provided elements deemed very appropriate to the con-
ditions of LDCs. 4 The concessionary transfer (the income transfer due to the 
concession) was justified to encourage the use of more capital-intensive inputs, 
and to compensate the farmer for: the inherent risks in agriculture; the 
paucity of cost-reducing infrastructure in the countryside; the past injustices 
done to farmers by moneylenders; and low product prices imposed by the govern-
ment to protect the interests of urban wage earners. 5 Little attention has 
heretofore been directed, however, at the tremendous political leverage that 
the concessionary transfer offers. 
The foreign influence in formulating and abetting the whole system and 
policy structure is apparent. First, most institutions and policies were 
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adopted in LDCs based upon the received doctrine from the developed countries 
(DCs), often with the advice of foreign advisors. Second, bilateral and multi-
lateral donors of foreign aid have extended many loans· for agricultural credit 
programs which have been fed into this institutional structure and P,olicy 
framework. 
A Model of the Political Economy of Agricultural Credit 
It is clear that present structures easily permit government control over 
the distribution and aJlocation of credit for both economic and political 
reasons. Now it remains to develop a model of the political economy of agri-
cultural credit. 
(Figure 1) 
Figure 1 presents a countrywide demand curve, DD', for agricultural 
credit. 6 Assume that the prevailing annual nominal rate of interest for non-
agricultural loans is r. If farmers were to borrow money at this rate, they 
would want to utilize oc1 credit. Suppose, however, that the government sub-
sidized agriculture by means of a concessionary interest rate policy for 
agricultural loans; a concession of three to ten points is common. If the 
concessionary rate were r', then farmers would want to borrow an additional 
amount, c2-c1 for agricultural purposes. In the process they would receive 
a subsidy or income transfer (the concessionary transfer) of r'rab, if nonprice 
credit rationing were not employed. 
There is an additional effect, however, which adds to the demand for 
agricultural credit. Credit is fungible and, although ostensibly borrowed 
for agri~ultural purposes, it can be diverted to nonagricultural activities. 
The result is agricultural illusion--a situation where some agricultural loans 
have the appearance of going to that sector but, in fact, are directed to non-
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agricultural purposes such as consumption or investment. This would be expected 
among farmers who have multiple occupations and/or knowledge about other invest-
ment opportunities. The effect of agricultural illusion is to cause an additional 
demand for agricultural credit. The addition of this demand to DD' causes a 
kink in the new demand schedule at r to form a demand for "agricultural" credit 
of DO". Thus, at the concessionary rate r', the concessionary transfer becomes 
r'rac. Agricultural illusion only occurs at rates below r when there is motive 
to ostensibly borrow for agriculture but to transfer funds to other sectors if 
the cost of agricultural credit is subsidized at rr'. 
Delinquency provides another possibility for an income transfer. A 
"delinquency transfer" may be temporary when farmers do not repay their loans 
on time or permanent when they never repay the loan. In the case of the tern-
porary transfer the farmer gains from improved income or reduced costs resulting 
from control over cash flow. The permanent transfer is equivalent to the real 
value of the loan principal plus real value of interest charges less any real 
amount repaid on loan and interest. In terms of Figure 1, the amount of the 
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permanent delinquency transfer would be the oc3 loan principal plus Or'cC3 
interest, assuming a concessionary interest rate of r', agricultural illusion 
and no repayment. 
When inflation is present, a situation common to LOCs, the real rate of 
interest may be quite low or even negative. The effect is to enlarge the con-
cessionary transfer and the temporary delinquency transfer (because of the 
lower real value of the loan when repaid). When inflation is anticipated by 
farmers the amount borrowed will increase in accordance with the demand schedule 
and will ·further enlarge both transfers. For example, assume a nominal con-
cessionary rate of r' and farmers anticipated the real rate of r" due to 
inflation. Borrowers would then gain an additional concessionary transfer due 
• 
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to inflation of r 11 r 1 ce and the potential for a permanent delinquency transfer 
of oc4 loan principal and Or11 ec4 interest. The higher the inflation, the 
greater will be these transfers. In the case of temporary transfers, the 
longer the delinquency, the greater the transfer. 
Clearly the concessionary and delinquency transfers themselves and the 
additions to these transfers resulting from inflation are to be coveted. 
Therefore, a government with its control over agricultural credit institutions 
can use these potential transfers to induce certain types of economic activity 
and/or to reward certain behavior among borrowers. Moreover, borrowers, in 
their competition for access to and their share of the transfer, will undoubtedly 
be willing to bargain with the government. Thus, there is an interplay between 
government and farmers in which political factors may take on considerable 
importance. In the case of authoritarian governments, such an interplay takes 
on increasing importance the weaker the government, since the government may 
find it more necessary to garner and maintain clientalistic support. 
In fact, heavy delinquency rates may be symptomatic of the degree that 
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political factors have entered into the loan. When the government does not 
take the legally available measures to bring pressure on the borrower to repay, 
this indicates an unwillingness to bear the administrative costs or political 
consequences of such action. 
The sheer existence of the concessionary transfer and the possibility of 
an easy delinquency transfer creates a potential for corruption. Government 
officials could easily appropriate part of the transfer for themselves by 
directly or indirectly lending to themselves, or by receiving kickbacks from 
borrowers·. 
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Consequences 
The consequences of using credit as a political instrument will vary 
depending on the specific situation in any country. It is possible, however, 
to draw generalizations about expected consequences in four areas: 
(a) resource allocation; (b) income distribution, (c) institution financial 
viability, and (d) economic development. 
Apart from political considerations the concessionary interest rate 
policy leads to a non-optimal social allocation of credit, other resources, 
and the production of goods in society unless there is an effective means of 
non-price rationing. Experience demonstrates, however, that non-price rationing 
schemes are difficult to enforce. The schemes are even more unworkable when 
political factors intervene. If inflation is present, the additional transfer 
due to inflation enhances the attractiveness of using credit for political 
objectives. If this occurs the resource allocation consequences are exacerbated. 
For example, it may encourage speculative investments and inventory stockpiling 
as well .as agricultural illusion. Access to the concessionary transfer (Gonzalez-
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Vega, 1977) and the delinquency transfer will affect income distribution. Those 
who receive the transfers as a result of borrowing or corruption will gain at 
the expense of others. Inflationary conditions will increase the benefits of 
those who receive these transfers. The net result, under any combination of 
the several transfers, is that the borrower gains income at the expense of the 
taxpayer or saver whose money is utilized to provide credit. Moreover, the 
borrower will gain income relative to those who have no credit or who borrow 
at true market rates of interest. Where the source is foreign, these effects 
have international implications as well. 
Concessionary interest rates lead to lower interest revenues for the 
lending institution. This, in combination with the well-recognized high costs 
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of administering agricultural credit programs, will seriously jeopardize a 
credit institution's financial viability. Further, political lending will 
lead to erosion of loan funds due to extensive delinquency inherent in such 
loans. The result is, that to cover costs and maintain or increase its loan-
able funds, the institution must be subsidized by government or obtain foreign 
loans or assistance. Without such supports, the institution's financial re-
sources would soon be gone. 
Finally, although it is well beyond the scope of this paper to discuss 
them in detail, it should be noted that there will be additional indirect 
impacts of credit allocation on balance of payments, government expenditures 
and revenues, price stability, rural-urban migration, sectorial development, 
and economic development in general. 
The Role of Foreign Donors 
Foreign economic assistance programs contribute to the use of credit as 
a political instrument in two ways. First, they have promulgated the policy 
of concessionary interest rates with the direct effect of creating concessionary 
transfers. Second, they have provided considerable economic assistance for 
agricultural credit programs. 
As a consequence, they have been an indirect contributor to the use of 
credit for political purposes leading to the transfers. This is particu-
larly true for loans which have been made for general agricultural sector 
development where credit typically flows to the larger and more sophisticated 
farmers and agricultural illusion takes on large dimensions. However, even 
in cases where foreign aid funds are earmarked for small farmers, the addi-
tional funds simply increase the size of the total portfolio and may permit 
some substitution for other funds previously directed to small farmers, thus 
releasing them for other purposes, including political. 
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Can't Interest Rates be Raised and Default Reduced? 
The obvious economic solution to prevent all these distortions is to 
raise interest rates and decrease default. There is increasing evidence that 
the conventional wisdom of using concessionary rates is wrong. Many policy 
makers in foreign assistance institutions and governments are now advocating 
this change on economic grounds. The private and government banking communi-
ties have long recognized the advantages of higher rates as a means to increase 
revenues and render their institutions more financially viable. 
Why, then, have policies of higher rates not been put into effect? 
Furthermore, why don't many lenders use their legal powers to limit default? 
The suggested answer is that the political cost is too great. First, govern-
ments would lose attractive elements available to them to bargain for political 
support. Second, farmers accustomed to the concessionary and/or default trans-
fers would stand to lose substantially. In particular, the impact would fall 
on the larger farmers who practice agricultural illusion with access to alter-
native investment-consumption activities. Third, where corruption occurs, 
government officials would lose their access to these sources of income. 
The Case of Bolivia 
The model is applied to Bolivia during 1971-1978, the period of the 
government of General Hugo Banzer. 7 
The Political Setting 
By 1964, the conservative middle class had co-opted what had started 
as a populist revolution in 1952 (Malloy). Private enterprise had begun to 
flourish in the department of Santa Cruz under the driving forces of newly 
developed petroleum and agricultural industries. The economic elite of this 
department came to carry considerable importance in national politics. Be-
tween 1969 and 1971, two leftward leaning governments attempted to bring the 
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revolution back to its populist beginnings much to the concern of this group. 
Thus in August 1971, the conservative military and private business interests 
in Santa Cruz rose under a coup led by Colonel Hugo Banzer, to overthrow the 
leftist government of Juan Jose Torres. In a rare occurrence for Bolivia, 
Banzer remained in power seven years until July 1978 when he was overthrown 
by a coup. As Mitchell points out, Banzer's success was marked by a coalition 
of the military and private business interests, particularly those of Santa 
Cruz, and the repression of workers, peasants and political opposition. It is 
widely recognized that he courted the Santa Cruz elite. 
This study shows how agricultural credit was employed to cater to this 
group, to whom he owed his rise to power as well as his continuance in office, 
by means of loans through the government-owned Bolivian Agricultural Bank (BAB). 
The analysis is limited to two crops, cotton and soybeans, which are basically 
grown by this elite in Santa Cruz and appear to have been most subject to 
political use. 
The Political Economy of Agricultural Credit 
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The regional distribution of agricultural credit since 1971 was highly 
skewed to the tropical lowlands in the department of Santa Cruz. Between 1973 
and 1978, 68 percent of commercial bank loans went to that department. 8 Be-
tween 1971 and 1978, 64 percent of the volume but only 23 percent of the 
number of BAB loans went to Santa Cruz. 9 In contrast, according to the 1976 
General Population Census, only 12.6 percent of the rural population lived 
in that department. Further, for the period 1964-1971, only 43 percent of BAB 
credit from regular credit lines went to Santa Cruz. 
Several interdependent factors explain the highly disporportionate share 
of flows of agricultural credit going to Santa Cruz in the Banzer period. 
First, the petroleum and agricultural boom in the region was viewed as the 
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leading edge of the Bolivian economy. Rapid gains in food import substitutes 
and agricultural exports were expected from the commercial farms whereas 
these possibilities were not foreseen for the small-scale traditional farming 
areas in the highlands. However, recent evidence by Clark suggests that this 
may not have been the case. He argues that the economic advantages of a 
development strategy emphasizing small-farmer production in the highlands 
would have important benefits for Bolivian income distribution, employment 
and lower investment requirements without seriously harming balance of payments 
or government fiscal revenues compared to the resource export strategy followed 
to date. 
Second, geopolitics was another factor. Bolivia has historically feared 
encroachment by Brazil. Fears were heightened by the discovery of petroleum 
reserves in Santa Cruz and agricultural development was viewed as creating a 
buffer against such an invasion. 
Whereas both of these factors were important in explaining the dispro-
portionate credit flows, we suggest that domestic political factors were also 
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important in the credit allocation. As noted previously, an important part 
of the Banzer coalition was the commercial farming interests in Santa Cruz. 
These were the persons to whom Banzer was obliged for his sudden rise to power 
and who posed a threat to the coalition were they to withdraw their support. 
The model provides the framework for examining the strength of the political 
aspects of credit. The institutional and policy structure is examined to show 
government's control over credit. This is followed by evidence on the concen-
tration of credit in the hands of the Santa Cruz commercial farmers and the 
sizeable ~oncessionary and delinquency transfers. 
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Institutional and Policy Structure 
Over the 1971-1978 period, 59 percent of the banking credit in Bolivia 
came from the Bolivian Agricultural Bank (BAB). In addition the government-
owned State Bank, a commercial bank, loaned approximately another 20 percent. 
The system was very amenable to government control. Credit was employed as 
the major agricultural sector policy instrument to 11 lead 11 agricultural produc-
tion by means of a number of special credit programs established by the 
government and donors of foreign aid. Key features of credit policy were 
concessionary interest rates and central bank rediscounts to the banking system 
from special credit lines for agriculture. 
Foreign assistance played a major role by providing a steady inflow of 
funds which freed government funds for lending to som~ major enterprises such 
as cotton {little foreign assistance was used for this crop), as well as for 
liquidity which the institutions needed in view of soaring and heavy delin-
quency. From 1967 to 1978, there were $146 million (all figures in this paper 
are reported in U.S. dollars) in foreign assistance committed for agricultural 
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credit. A conservative estimate is that at least 45 percent of bank credit 
{BAB and commercial banks) came from this source. 
Concentration of Credit 
Over the 1971-1978 period BAB loaned $80.9 million in Santa Cruz in 3,348 
loans. Of this amount $45.9 million went to cotton (56 and 36 percent of 
Santa Cruz and national totals respectively) in a total of 726 loans (22 and 
5 percent of Santa Cruz and national totals respectively). A much smaller 
amount, $4.1 million, was directed to 118 farmers for soybeans. The average 
size loan for cotton and soybeans was $63,169 and $34,525 respectively, much 
larger than the $5,287 national average. Credit for the two crops, which 
represented 41 percent of the national BAB loan portfolio, only went to a few 
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fanners, 6 percent of BAB loans. These loans were made basically to the larger 
farmers of Santa Cruz, many of whom belonged to that region's elite and/or to 
powerful regional interest groups such as ADEPA (The Cotton Growers Association). 
Income Transfers 
As shown in Table I, the recipients of BAB cotton and soybean loans re-
ceived total income transfers of at least $44.5 million over the period, an 
amount only slightly less than the $49.9 million of principal originally loaned. 
The average transfers for cotton and soybean loans were $55 and $39 thousand 
respectively. 
(Table I) 
As shown in Table II the concessionary transfer results from interest 
rate concessions of 12 to 15 percent for BAB clients relative to the rates 
charged by conunercial banks for commercial loans. Since the conunercial rates 
are maximum rates established by the Central Bank, they are likely to be less 
than the true opportunity cost of credit. To the extent this holds true, the 
concessionary transfer is understated. 
{Table II) 
The effect of inflation is to reduce the real interest rate and there-
fore to provide an additional transfer to the borrower. With the exception 
of 1973 and 1974, inflation in Bolivia was mild, yet the income transfer 
associated with inflation was very substantial, estimated at $8.2 million. 
From 1971 to 1978, BAB delinquency went from bad to worse. At the end 
of 1971, 15 percent of the loan portfolio was overdue; at the end of 1978 it 
was 43 percent after reaching a high of 47 percent in 1977. Had many loans 
not been refinanced or extended the situation would have been much worse. 
During 1978, ·116 loans were extended. Furthermore, several BAB loans have 
been extended many times. The delinquency is concentrated in Santa Cruz; in 
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1978, 68.8 percent of the total BAB delinquency was in that department. In 
Santa Cruz 48 and 52 percent of loan numbers and volume were past due compared 
to 27 and 43 percent nationally. Both cotton and soybeans contributed to the 
high proportion of loan volume delinquency. 
At the end of 1978, the delinquency transfer associated with cotton and 
soybeans was $30.1 million. This is the virtual equivalent of a permanent 
income transfer because prior to June 1977 the government would not permit the 
BAB authorities to pressure farmers for repayment. Also, to keep some private 
commercial banks from pressuring farmers, the government bought these banks' 
delinquent portfolios and transferred them to BAB. In June 1977, Banzer issued 
a Supreme Decree which extended all BAB and State Bank cotton and soybean loans 
for periods of eight to twelve years. If the loans are paid.back as scheduled, 
the borrowers will pay back virtually nothing in terms of real value due to the 
depreciating effects of inflation. 
The large BAB income transfers for borrowers for the two crops in Santa 
Cruz cannot be entirely attributed to political factors. Poor client selec-
tion, bad weather, insects and marketing are other reasons. But even in cases 
of the latter, political intervention led to sizeable transfers. For example, 
in 1973, BAB and commercial banks financed large quantities of cotton and ADEPA 
made forward contracts to sell cotton on the world market. When the world price 
exceeded the forward price ADEPA refused to sell. The government supported them 
and established a minimum price. The world buyers refused to pay this price and 
much cotton remained unsold while delinquency soared. 
The case of BAB is illustrative of what also happened in the State Bank. 
Unfortunately inadequate data do not permit careful measurement of transfers 
for credit from that institution. They are, however, sizeable. This institu-
tion also began to lend heavily for cotton and soybeans in Santa Cruz after 
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1972. By 1977, they had discontinued lending to agriculture because of the 
heavy delinquency. In 1978, they had $22.4 million in 232 past due loans most 
of which were for cotton and soybeans. 1° Clearly, income transfers associated 
with these loans were also very substantial. 
Consequences 
The evidence of large income transfers for a small group of commercial 
farmers in Santa Cruz strongly supports the widely held view in Bolivia that 
agricultural credit was used extensively for political purposes by the Banzer 
administration. The model provides a framework for analyzing the role of credit 
in this context and for developing rough measures of the magnitudes of the 
income transfers. 
The effect of credit being used as a political instrument to benefit the 
Santa Cruz commercial farming elite undoubtedly contributed to political .sta-
bility during the Banzer reign. Yet the abuses did not represent the will of 
the people. When government repression was lifted with the 1978 elections, 
the general populace and especially the rural masses expressed their dis-
pleasure with this and other Banzer practices when they did not provide 
sufficient votes for Banzer's hand-picked successor to elect him to office in 
spite of strong government efforts to ensure his election. 
The economic consequences of credit as a political instrument undoubtedly 
contributed to this discontent. Access to credit and the associated income 
transfers by the elite gave them a larger share of national income. Their 
ability to practice agricultural illusion further enhanced their income and 
worsened regional and personal income distribution. The highland peasants 
gained little, and if it had not been for foreign aid for small farmer credit, 
which began in 1975, it is doubtful that this large mass of farmers would have 
received much credit at all. 
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The concessionary interest rate directly leads to agricultural illusion· 
and a misallocation of resources. The process, however, is exacerbated by 
permissive delinquency when borrowers realize that they will not have to repay 
on time. This permits funds to be invested in longer-term and/or speculative 
investments as well as consumptive items. It is well known that, because of 
their multiple occupations and wealth, the Santa Cruz elite is active in these 
types of spending. 
The long-run viability of financial institutions was seriously harmed. 
After 1976, the State Bank withdrew from agricultural lending because of the 
high costs associated with its heavy delinquency. In March 1979, BAB had to 
be rescued from bankruptcy by the government when it issued $41.5 million in 
bonds (El Diario) which permitted BAB to meet its financial obligations. The 
need for such action further eroded public opinion of these institutions and 
contributed to a loss of confidence in the government. 
Conclusions 
It should not be surprising that government controlled credit institu-
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tions and policy can be used for political objectives although they are cast 
in the context of economics. Credit as a political instrument is very attrac-
tive to a government because it is rapidly implementable and has the appearance 
of going for worthwhile economic objectives but in reality offers opportunities 
for considerable benefits to borrowers by means of income transfers and gains 
from fungibility. Moreover, because the true benefits are hard to identify, 
they are less subject to the scrutiny of the opposition and the general public. 
The usefulness of the present study is to provide a theoretical framework 
to show the usefulness of agricultural credit as a political-economic instru-
ment particularly where :oncessionary interest rates and permissive default 
are employed. The Bolivian case clearly illustrates the political economy of 
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credit as it was applied by Banzer in 1971 to 1978. It also shows the unin-
tended role of foreign assistance in abetting the use of credit in a political 
context. 
The Bolivian case is not unique. It is likely that political forces 
figure strongly in credit allocation decisions in most nations. While they 
may contribute to political stability, they are subject to abuse and have unde-
sirable consequences for resource allocation, income distribution and financial 
institution viability. The degree to which credit can be used as a political 
instrument would be substantially reduced if concessionary interest rates were 
eliminated, a tougher stance on default were taken and inflation reduced. 
The voluntary implementation of the required interest rate and default 
policies will be difficult to attain given the high costs to governments in 
the loss of a political instrument. Therefore pressures will have to be exerted 
by foreign donors in an appeal to improve resource allocation, income distri-
bution and financial institution viability. 
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Footnotes 
*Appreciation is expressed to Professors Dale W Adams, Enrique Gomez, 
James M. Malloy, Edward J. Williams, and anonymous reviewers for their helpful 
conments on an earlier version of this paper. Research for this paper was 
supported in part by the U.S. Agency for International Development. The authors 
alone are responsible for the content of the paper. 
1It is important to distinguish between the formal market sources (those 
legal entities which are established for purposes of providing credit and, 
perhaps, other financial intermediation services) and informal market sources 
(those who provide credit but do not have such formal status, such as money-
lenders, friends, relatives, and merchants). In LDCs the size of the informal 
market is unknown but in most countries it is considered quite important in 
terms of numbers of farmers reached. 
2This has been recognized by J. D. Von Pischke in a more specialized 
sense than is in this paper. 
\ 
3The supply-leading approach in contrast to the demand-leading approach 
is set forth in Hugh T. Patrick. 
4The Farm Security Administration, later renamed the Farmers Home Admini-
stration (FHA), was established in the U.S. in the Great Depression to provide 
subsidized and supervised credit to low-income farmers who offered strong 
potential for economic advancement but did not have access to credit from normal 
formal market sources. Because of the apparent similarity of conditions in 
LDCs, it was natural that the FHA model should have been transferred to those 
countries. This tendency was reinforced by the fact that many FHA officials 
were used as advisors to LDCs in establishing credit programs. Subsequent 
experience in LDCs has shown that the supervision function was so expensive 
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or ineffective that most institutions have considerably diminished this aspect 
of the model, but the concessionary interest rate subsidy has remained for 
reasons set forth in this paper. 
5For a good discussion of the reasons, see Donald. 
6The pioneering work on the concepts formalized in this model was done 
by Adams and Gonzalez-Vega (1976). 
7For a good discussion of the political developments in Bolivia over 
this period see Mitchell as well as Malloy and Borzutsky. 
8Private communication from Banco Central de Bolivia. 
9oata from Departamento de Planificaci6n, Unidad Estadfstica, from 
Banco Agrfcola de Bolivia. All data reported in the remainder of this paper 
come from this source unless otherwide indicated. 
lOPrivate communication from the Banco del Estado. 
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TABLE I 
Concessionary and Delinquency Transfers Associated With 
Cotton and Soybean Loans of Bolivian Agricultural Bank, 1971-1978 
(Thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Loan Volume 
Number of Loans 
Average Loan Size 
Percent Past Due (Dec. 31, 1978) 
Delinquency Transfer 
Interest and Commissions 
Principal 
Concessionary Transfer 
Transfers due to Inflation 
Total Transfer 
Average Transfer Per Loan 
Cotton 
45,861 
726 
63 
51 
3,342 
23,491 
5,680 
7,399 
39,912 
55 
Soybeans 
4,074 
118 
35 
69 
418 
2,823 
519 
829 
4,589 
39 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Bolivian Agricultural Bank Data. 
• 
Inflation ratea 
Commercial Bank 
interest rate 
BAB Nominal 
interest rate 
TABLE II 
Inflation and Real Interest Rates for Loans 
From Bolivian Agricultural Bank 
(percent) 
Year 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
3.7 6.5 31. 5 62.8 7.9 4.5 
27 25 25 25 25 25 
12 10 10 13 13 13 
BAB Concession points 15 15 15 12 12 12 
BAB Real 8.0 3.3 -16.3 -30.6 4.7 8.1 interest rate 
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1977 
8.1 
25 
13 
12 
4.5 
Sources: Banco Central de Bolivia, Boletin estadfstico, No. 230, Junia, 
1978 
15.0b 
25 
13 
12 
-1. 7 
\ 1978, p. 59 and private communication Banco Central de Bolivia, 
Departmento de Estudios Econ6micos. 
aBased on consumer price index for La Paz. 
bAnnual rate for first six months of year. 
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FIGURE 1. Kinked Demand for Agricultural Credit 
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